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is too interesting and too important for our understanding of policy consequences from realignments to leave the matter unresolved.
PAUL ALLEN BECK

University of Pittsburgh

Vol. 70

scheme devised by the S.R.C. and elaborated by others, a
treatment of the Court similar to that which Chambers
and Burnham have done for the parties.... Any study
such as this, based upon aggregate data, necessarily
sacrifices situational focus for numerological standardization, but Supreme Court decisions are not fungible
goods.

To THE EDITOR:

I think Professor Beck's criticisms very well
taken. Indeed, they reflect certain caveats which I
myself noted in my article. While his reservations
about the analysis are appropriate, however, the
vigor with which he presses them suggests that he
has, in part, missed the point of the essay.
After three paragraphs which reasonably accurately summarize "The Supreme Court and
Critical Elections," Professor Beck's central point
(italicized, lest the unwary reader miss it) is made
at the beginning of his fourth paragraph. I agree
with that point. But I fail to see how it materially
adds anything to what I wrote (p. 807):
... The use here of some years before the elections
which brought new coalitions to power as part of the
realignment phases may very probably have artificially
deflated the indexes for the critical periods....
Perhaps
future research might attempt to determine the year of
the ascendancy of the new coalition....
Such attempts
to determine precise years of ascendancy, however, not
only must contend with the scholarly contentiousness
about which elections actually involved realignments but
also will be liable to the charge that they have defined
the critical periods so as to inflate the statistical results.
... If the results reported here can be achieved by using
realignment phases not inherently favorable to the thesis,
they may perhaps be considered to be even more
persuasive.

As for Beck's remarks concerning the New Deal
period, I would simply refer him to my footnote
67.
"The Supreme Court and Critical Elections"
was intended-and, I think, can and should so be
read-as a synthetic rather than an original
analytic effort. It was an attempt, as I stated in
several places, to both integrate and test the assertions of certain leaders in our profession-most
notably Dahl, but also Burnham-on their own
terms. This effort at replication was dictated by my
belief that we social scientists too little attempt to
build upon one another's work as do our brethren
in the natural sciences.
I could not more agree with Professor Beck that
such an integrative statement as is represented by
my article is but the beginning not the end of
analysis, and I very much concur in his judgment
that such an analysis must "examine the background of each case individually." I said as much
in the article (p. 808):
Ultimately, the subject calls for an extended, systemof the Court's decision
atic, historical examination
making explicitly based upon the electoral classification

Indeed, my conception of what is required is apparently much more ambitious than Beck's; I
think we need nothing less than a definitive intellectual history of the Court; something we do
not now have. (See also my note 84.) I am encouraged that someone with Professor Beck's
analytic skills also thinks the pursuit important.
RICHARD FUNSTON

San Diego State University
Alliance Behavior in Nineteenth-Century

To

Europe

THE EDITOR:

In their recent analysis of nineteenth-century
European alliance activity, McGowan and Rood
allude to two separate dimensions of alliance
and temporal. "If these
aggregation-spatial
[Kaplan's] rules are violated, either by a rigid
enmity, such as existed between France and Germany after the annexation of Alsace Lorraine
[spatial], or by a decline in the system alliance
formation rate [temporal], then a loss of system
flexibility will result and system-changing events
are likely."'
Despite their repeated assertions that independence and flexibility in the matter of "whom the
alliance partners are"2 are vital to the maintenance
of a balance of power system and their quoting
Kaplan in the same vein ("the 'balance of power'
system postulates that any alignment is as probable as any other alignment prior to a consideration of the specific interests which divide nations.
Moreover, any particular alignment should not
predispose the same nations to align themselves
with each other at the next opportunity"),3 the
authors go on to ignore the spatial dimension of
alliance aggregation in their data analysis. They
test, instead, three hypotheses which concern the
times at which alliances in nineteenth-century
Europe were formed. These are
Hi: in a balance of power international system, the
occurrence of alliances will be stochastically distributed (the number of alliances formed per unit
of time is a Poisson random variable), and
H2: in a balance of power international system, the
time intervals between alliances are randomly
distributed (the distribution of interalliance intervals is a negative exponential random variable).4
'Patrick J. McGowan and Robert M. Rood, "Alliance
Behavior in Balance of Power Systems: Applying a
Poisson Model to Nineteenth-Century Europe," American
Political Science Review, 69 (September 1975), 862.
2
3
4

Ibid., p. 861.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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portunity to grow weary of one's friends."9
and
It seems likely, then, that if threats to a very
H3: in a balanceof powerinternationalsystem,a decline in the systemicrate of allianceformation polarized (spatially nonrandom) system occur
precedessystemchangingevents,suchas general randomly (or according to a Poisson distribution),
war.5
causing alliance formation within the system,
Past scholarship, however, hardly agrees with most students of the balance of power "theory"
McGowan and Rood that the time at which alli- would say that the system itself is neither fluid
ances are formed is the most important aspect of nor flexible (i.e., it would be a rigid system retheir relation to the operation of balance of power sponding to random stimuli). On the other hand, a
systems. Edward Gulick's account of European system of spatially random alliances would usually
alliances is generally accepted as a classic account be considered fluid and flexible whether it was
of the operation of a balance of power system responding to random or nonrandom (temporally)
(Robert Jervis's observation that Gulick's subject stimuli. Therefore, the more important of the two
matter is more properly to be considered a "con- dimensions of alliance aggregation would seem to
cert system" notwithstanding). In citing an ex- be the spatial one.
Although McGowan and Rood have given us an
ample of the requisite (especially for the "holder
of the balance") "mobility of action" for the main- excellent analysis of the temporal randomness of
tenance of a balance of power system,6 he empha- nineteenth-century alliances in Europe, it would
sizes the identities of allies and opponents at least be far more interesting and important to know
as much as, if not indeed more than, the times at whether these same temporally Poisson-distribwhich the alliances were concluded. Richard uted alliances exhibit spatial randomness as well.
If they do, then McGowan and Rood's analysis
Rosecrance argues that
(not to mention balance of power "theory" itself)
the balancingsystemof Europerequiredstates to ally
or oppose each other accordingto the presumeddis- would gain much more credibility. If, however,
tributionof power: if ideologicalbonds or animosities spatial alignment during the period is shown to be
had arisen, states could no longer have chartedtheir nonrandom-and more especially if the resulting
courses on power considerationsalone; states would pattern of alliance partners is indistinguishable
haverefusedto balanceagainsttheirideologicalconfreres from that of the 1910-1914 period's rigidity (which
or to align themselveswith ideologicalopponents,re- has been said to have been the cause of the disgardlessof the configurationof power.7
integration of the European balance of power sysDina Zinnes assumes the importance of spatial tem and its transformation to a more-or-less
flexibility when she constructs her analytic model bipolar one), then not only might McGowan and
of a "hypothetical world" of possible alliance com- Rood's analysis lose much of its credibility and
binations in such a way that "the labels of the theoretical usefulness but also the usefulness of
nations are unimportant. The relevant factors are structural theories for the study of international
the number of alliances of various sizes and the politics in general might be brought into quesplacing and number of power equalities and in- tion.10
McGowan and Rood's data consist of 54 alliequalities."8 Nicholas Spykman offers simply that
ances
among European states during the period
"he who plays the balance of power can have no
permanent friends. His devotion can be to no 1814-1909. Although other states occasionally are
specific state but only to balanced power. The ally included in these alliances, most of the activity
of today is the enemy of tomorrow. One of the concerns only five states-Austria, France, Great
Britain, Prussia, and Russia. Their alignments
charms of power politics is that it offers no opduring the period can be summarized according to
partners as follows:
State
Austria
Prussia
Russia
France
Great Britain

Prussia

Russia

20

12
11

5 McGowan and Rood, p. 862.
Edward Vose Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of
Power (New York: Norton, 1967), p. 68.
N. Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in
7 Richard
World Politics (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), p. 28.
8 Dina A. Zinnes, "An Analytical Study of the Balance
of Power Theories," Journal of Peace Research 4 (1967),
273.
6

Aligned with
France
3
1
7

Great Britain

other

13
6
9
9

12
9
3
6
10

'Nicholas
Spykman, America's Strategy in World
Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942), p. 103.
10 Arthur L. Stinchcombe's
ideas concerning theory
testing should be apparent here, if only in some twisted
form. See especially his Constructing Social Theories (New
York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968).
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From this table, the frequencies of bilateral relations within the system can be seen. These can then
be listed according to frequency (starting with the
most frequently-found partnership):
Austria-Prussia
Austria-Great Britain
Austria-Russia
Prussia-Russia
Russia-Great Britain
France-Great Britain
Russia-France
Prussia-Great Britain
Austria-France
Prussia-France

20
13
12
11
9
9
7
6
3
1

Since there are ten possible pairs of states in the
data set, the probability that any one pair will
occur, given that any one pair is just as likely as
any other, is 1/10. Ninety-one bilateral ties occur
in the matrix above. Therefore, an hypothesis of
spatial randomness among the states under consideration would predict that each cell frequency
would be 9.1. It is immediately apparent from
both the matrix and the list presented above that
this is not the case. The alliances which formed the
McGowan-Rood
data set are not spatially random.
One finds instead that Austria is allied with
Prussia more than twice as often as random distribution would predict. On the other hand, a
Prussia-France alliance almost never occurs at all
and an Austria-France one is very little more frequent. Only the Great Britain-Russia and FranceGreat Britain ties occur as frequently as balance
of power "theory" would expect.
If Austria-Prussia alliances predominated during the 1814-1909 period in Europe while Great
Britain-Russia and France-Great Britain alliances
occurred at least no less frequently than they
would by chance, the modal alliance pattern for
the system as a whole would seem very little different from the pattern which obtained in 1914."
Balance of power "theory" (and all structural
theories of international politics) then faces the

Vol. 70

question of why pre-1910 European alliance
rigidity did not cause international system transformation whereas post- 1910 rigidity did. The only
satisfactory answer to this question may have
to be found at the individual-nation-as-actor
level
of analysis.'2 Although this is another matter deserving further empirical research, it should be
noted that Kaplan himself considered balance of
power systems to be "subsystem dominant," 13 in
other words, not amenable to systems (structural)
theories and explanations at all: but rather dependent upon the actions and orientations of individual states.
Finally, an even more fundamental criticism can
be made of both the McGowan and Rood analysis
and this very brief one. Both analyses are in some
fundamental sense after the fact of alliance, concerning themselves only with the point at which
the "specific interests" of states have already
shown themselves and the states in the system have
taken up sides according to those interests.
Kaplan's classic statement bears repeating: "the
'balance of power' system postulates that any
alignment is as probable as any other alignment

prior to a consideration of the specific interests
which divide nations (emphasis added)." By the
time alliances form, it is too late to determine this
probability. Any study which concerns itself
solely with alliances which have already come into
being cannot adequately address itself to the task
of testing balance of power "theory."
FRED H. LAWSON

University of California, Los Angeles
12 For a very precise
delimitation
of the two levels of international
political
analysis, see William B. Moul, "The
Level of Analysis
Problem
Revisited,"
Canadian Journal
of Political Science 6 (September
1973), 494-513.
'" Morton
A. Kaplan,
System and Process in International Politics (New York: Wiley, 1957), pp. 27, 125.

To THE EDITOR:

As we understand Mr. Lawson, he makes six
points in his criticism of our recent study of balI If the grand coalitions which were formed just after ance of power alliance behavior in nineteenthcentury Europe:
the Congress of Vienna are dropped from the McGowan
(1) the choice of alliance partner (and, by imand Rood data set, then the general bipolarity of the
European state system during the remainder of the nine- plication, opponent) is an important aspect of balteenth century becomes considerably more evident. With ance of power theory;
an hypothesis of randomness expecting identical frequen(2) we ignored this "spatial" dimension of allicies of 5.3 for each bilateral combination, the following
ance aggregation in our exclusively "temporal"
frequencies are actually observed:
study;
Austria-Prussia
14
(3) if alliance pairings among the five great
France-Great Britain
7
European powers in the nineteenth century are apAustria-Russia
7
proximately random, then our analysis and balAustria-Great Britain
7
Russia-France
6
ance of power theory "would gain much more
Prussia-Russia
6
credibility," but if "spatial alignment . .. is . .
Russia-Great Britain
4
nonrandom," then our study and other "structural
Prussia-Great Britain
I
Austria-France
I
theories" of international
politics "might be
Prussia-France
0
brought into question";
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(4) according to his presentation of our data,
alliances "are not spatially random";
(5) moreover, ex post facto research, such as our
original study and his comment, cannot "test"
balance of power theory;
(6) therefore, our study and balance of power
theories are of dubious value.
We appreciate Mr. Lawson's interest in our
paper and we welcome this opportunity to respond
to his interpretation of our work and thereby to
extend research in this important area of international relations theory.
Before we discuss each issue Mr. Lawson has
raised, two general comments are in order. First,
although he cites Moul's fine paper,2 we do not
think he has fully understood its relevance to his
critique. The units of analysis and the treatment
of time are completely different in our article and
in his comment. We presented a longitudinal
study of one international system, whereas Lawson
works with a single aggregated cross-section of
time (96 years!) and ten pairs of states. In Moul's
language, for Lawson to claim that his critique
says anything about the findings of our article is a
clear instance of "confounding
the ecological
fallacy with a cross-sectional-longitudinal
fallacy."' However, Lawson's presentation of our
data is of interest in its own right, a point we shall
consider. Second, Lawson has not reanalyzed our
data, he has simply presented without citation and
with several counting errors4 information reported
four years ago in Table 7 and Appendix A of
Rood's dissertation.5
(1) Without question, at the levels of states and
pairs of states, patterns of choice of alliance partner are a fundamental aspect of balance of power
theory. However, to examine this issue in an entirely static, cross-sectional fashion as Lawson
does obscures the dynamic, sequential nature of
alignments, making it difficult to discuss in an intelligent manner alliance flexibility and also making more probable a spatially skewed distribution
of the behavior between pairs of states, or any
other interacting units for that matter.6
1
We made these data available to Mr. Lawson at his request, a fact he fails to acknowledge.
2 William B. Moul, "The Level of
Analysis Problem Revisited," Canadian Journal of Political Science 6 (September, 1973), 494-513.
3Ibid., pp. 501-502.
4 The errors are: (1) our alliances number 55, not 54; (2)
the Austria-Prussia pair has 21, not 20 alliances, and (3)
the Austria-Great Britain pair has 12, not 13. These correct
figures are used in the new analysis we report in this communication.
5Robert
M. Rood, "Agreement in the International
System" (Ph.D. dissertation in Political Science, Syracuse
University, 1973), 88, 183-201.
6 Edwin Kuh, "The Validity of Cross-Sectionally
Estimated Behavior Equations in Time Series Applications,"
Econometrica 27 (1959), 197-214.
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(2) It is obvious that we did not examine the
dyadic level problem of alliance choice in our exclusively system level paper. It is also obvious
that Mr. Lawson has not read carefully or has not
understood fully our article and Rood's dissertation from which he obtained our data. To repeat
what we said in our article,' Rood's study was an
explicit test of the dyadic level proposition that
"any alignment is as probable as any other alignment prior to a consideration of the specific interests which divide nations."8 Rood was unable to
falsify this proposition when a probabilistic model
of agreement among pairs of actors developed by
Brams and O'Leary was applied to the data.9
Moreover, subsequent research has shown that
deviations from this model may be explained
statistically by the magnitude of war within each
pair of states,'0 a violation of its assumptions that
balance-of-power theory predictions should affect
choice of alliance partners and opponents." 1
(3) We strongly agree that if it can be demonstrated that alliances occur on both a spatially and
temporarily random basis, then our study and
balance-of-power theory will have their credibility
enhanced. The problem with Lawson's critique is
that skewed cross-sectional data are not necessarily
evidence of nonrandomness in statistical models,
particularly (a) when one works with a simplistic
probability model, equal probability, (b) when the
N is small, only ten dyads, and (c) when the author
merely "eyeballs" the data rather than applying
the appropriate statistical goodness of fit test.
Lawson, in his "analysis" of our data, makes the
same mistake Londoners did during World War
II when they were sure that German rocket bombs
fell in clusters in certain neighborhoods. A Poisson-based analysis of the spatial distribution of
south London bomb hits indicated perfect randomness.12 We would advise Mr. Lawson to heed
Feller's conclusion regarding "the established fact
that to the untrained eye randomness appears as
7 Patrick J. McGowan and Robert M. Rood, "Alliance
Behavior in Balance of Power Systems: Applying a
Poisson Model to Nineteenth-Century Europe," American
Political Science Review 69 (September, 1975), 863.
8 Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York: Wiley Science Editions, 1964),
Preface.
9 Rood, "Agreement in the International System," pp.
159-163; Steven J. Brams and Michael K. O'Leary, "An
Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies," American Political
Science Review 64 (June, 1970), 449-470.
10 Robert M. Rood, "The Dyadic Distribution of Alliance Commitments," Columbia: Department of Government and International Studies, University of South
Carolina, mimeo, 1975.
' That is, the patterned relationships of international
conflict (magnitude of war within dyads) certainly are
"specific interests which divide nations."
12 William Feller, An Introduction to Probability Theory
and Its Applications, 3rd ed. (New York: Wiley, 1968),
160-161.
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regularity or tendency to cluster."'3
(4) In point of fact, alliance choice is randomly
distributed in the five power nineteenth-century
European balance of power system. Table 1 shows
this when the spatial t-axis is defined in terms of
pairs of states and grouped in units of four alliances. We have also calculated goodness-of-fit tests
for cutting points of two and three alliance units
with similar results. Substantively, contrary to
Lawson's reading of our data, we can report that
the hypothesis, in a balaace-oJ-power system, pairwise choice of alliance partner will be stochastically
distributed (the number of alliances formed per
dyad is a Poisson random variable), cannot be rejected and is independent of how the number of
alliances is categorized. Methodologically, Table
1 is cross-sectional (spatial) with all the attendant
Table 1. The Pair-wise Choice of Alliance Partners in
Europe, 1814-1914, as a Poisson Distribution

Numberof
alliances
per dyad

Number
Observed

Number
Expected

2
2
3
3

.2
2.9
4.7
2.1

10
4.48, d.f.=3, p=.21
Kolmogorov-Smirnovtestb, p> .20

9.9

0-3
4-7
8-11
? 12

pa

.0198
.2924
.4709
.2068

X2=

a Calculated from T. Kitagawa, Tables of the Poisson
Distribution (Tokyo: Baifukan, 1952).
b Calculated from Sidney Siegel, Nonparametric Statisticsjor the Behavioral Sciences (New York: McGrawHill, 1956), pp. 47-51.

13

Feller, Probability Theory,p. 161.
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problems we have discussed regarding such
analyses, and the N is very small. Nevertheless, we
appreciate Mr. Lawson's stimulus and we hope
that this original demonstration of the spatial
randomness of alliances leads him to find more
credible our original study as well as balance of
power theory and structural theories of international politics in general.
(5) It is difficult to determine what Mr. Lawson
means by his concluding criticism that balance of
power theory cannot be "tested" by nonexperimental methods including historical research and
quantitative international political analysis. If he
is correct, then the "theory" is no more empirical
than the statement "everything which happens is
God's will." We think Professor Kaplan intends
to say more than such truisms and that in making
statements about possible alliance partners and
opponents, one must include the specific interests
which divide nations as part of the statement of
initial conditions from which the explanation
(postdiction) or prediction is deduced. Could
Kaplan mean anything else by his "classic statement" and still claim to advocate a "scientific"
approach to the study of international relations
as he so often does?'4

(6) For all of these reasons, including his
changes in the level of analysis and temporal organization, we cannot accept Mr. Lawson's
criticisms. We do, however, thank him for his interest in our work.
PATRICK J. MCGOWAN

University of Southern California
ROBERT M. ROOD

University of South Carolina
14 Morton A. Kaplan, "The New
Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations," in
K. Knorr and J. N. Rosenau, eds., Contending Approaches
to International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1969), pp. 38-61.

